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Comment 
YOU’RE GETTING OUT EARLY:  WELCH V. 
UNITED STATES ALLOWS OFFENDERS TO 
RETROACTIVELY ATTACK SENTENCES 
UNDER THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL 
ACT† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal Statute 18 U.S.C. § 924, commonly referred to as the Armed 
Career Criminal Act, was enacted to forbid certain types of people to 
“ship, possess, and receive firearms” through the imposition of 
mandatory minimum sentencing.1  Though many may think the purpose 
of the Act is to deter the use of guns by convicted felons, its main purpose 
is to incapacitate career criminals through the imposition of mandatory 
minimum sentencing.2  In 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued 
its opinion in Johnson v. United States invalidating the residual clause of the 
Armed Career Criminal Act.3  After this decision, the Court had to address 
whether the new rule created in Johnson should be retroactively applied to 
challenges against prior sentences levied under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act’s residual clause.4   
                                                
† Winner of the 2017 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition.  
1 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015).  See also Begay v. United States, 
553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) (explaining that offenders qualifying under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act as having committed violent offenses are “potentially more dangerous” when 
armed with a weapon, which is the “eponym of the statute”); United States v. Trujillo, 225 
F.Supp.3d 1222, 1225 (D. Colo. 2016) (showing that the Armed Career Criminal Act mandates 
a 15-year minimum sentence for anyone convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act). 
2 See James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 547–48 (2009) (stating that 
“[a]lthough the Armed Career Criminal Act enhances the punishment for illegally 
possessing firearms, it does not appear that Congress’s primary intent was to punish career 
criminals for possessing guns or to deter such possession.”  Instead, “the Armed Career 
Criminal Act’s primary goal [is] incapacitating career criminals who are likely to re-offend 
and pose a danger to the public if not incarcerated.”).  
3 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (explaining that the residual clause of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act violates the Fifth Amendments’ Due Process Clause because it is too 
vague). 
4 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016) (advising that the Court 
granted certiorari to address the broader legal issue of whether the new rule established in 
Johnson applied retroactively on collateral review). 
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Generally, the Court strictly limits when rules will have retroactive 
application.5  In determining whether a new constitutional principle 
applies retroactively the Court must decide whether the new rule is a 
substantive or procedural change.6  In Welch v. United States, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the new rule in Johnson was a substantive 
change to the law and should apply retroactively to cases brought on 
collateral appeal.7 
First, this Comment presents the facts of Welch v. United States.8  Next, 
this Comment discussed the Court’s history of retroactive application of 
new rules to cases on collateral appeal, focusing particularly on the 
distinction between substantive and procedural rules.9  Finally, this 
Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s holding in Welch and what the 
Court failed to address in its decision, and the implications of the decision 
going forward. 10 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN WELCH V. UNITED STATES 
In 2010, police went to Gregory Welch’s apartment looking for a 
robbery suspect who had shot two people during an attempted robbery.11  
After entering the apartment, police encountered Welch in a bedroom and 
gained consent to search the apartment for the weapon involved in the 
robbery.12  The search uncovered a weapon in the attic which Welch later 
admitted was his.13  Welch later plead guilty to being a felon in possession 
                                                
5 See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (noting that concerns of finality 
lead the Court to limit “the circumstances under which a guilty plea may be attacked on 
collateral review.”).  See also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (stating that the general 
rule is that a new rule does not have retroactive application unless it is a substantive rule or 
a watershed rule of criminal procedure). 
6 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (adopting the test for retroactive application of new rules as 
whether the rule is a substantive or procedural rule).  See also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621 (stating 
that the “distinction between substance and procedure is an important one in the habeus 
context.”). 
7 See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265 (holding that Johnson is a substantive decision and should 
therefore be given retroactive application). 
8 See infra Part II (providing the factual background of Welch v. United States).  
9 See infra Part III (discussing the history of retroactive application based on whether the 
new rule created is substantive or procedural). 
10 See infra Part IV (analyzing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Welch v. United States by 
considering a factor that the court failed to address and possible issues related to Welch going 
forward). 
11 See Welch, 683 F.3d at 1306 (providing the reason why police went to Welch’s 
apartment). 
12 See id. (outlining how the police gained consent to search Welch’s apartment). 
13 See id. at 1306–07 (upholding the search of Welch’s apartment).  Welch challenged the 
validity of the search, but the Eleventh Circuit upheld the search as constitutional based on 
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of a firearm.14  Due to his prior three violent felony convictions, Welch 
was categorized as an armed career criminal and sentenced to the 
minimum fifteen-year sentence imposed by the Armed Career Criminal 
Act.15 
On appeal, Welch argued that his conviction for robbery, which was 
used to subject him to the minimum sentencing standards of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act, was not a violent felony as defined by the statute.16  
However, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and upheld Welch’s fifteen-year 
sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.17  The Supreme Court 
later granted certiorari in Welch’s case to consider whether Johnson had 
created a new rule that should apply retroactively to sentences under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act.18 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF WELCH V. UNITED STATES 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
“no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”19  In Johnson, the Supreme Court found that the residual 
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was so vague that a normal 
person could not determine which conduct was being criminalized.20  
Therefore, the Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process 
Clause of the 5th Amendment.21 
                                                
the initial protective sweep that the police conducted and Welch’s subsequent consent of the 
search of the apartment.  See id. at 1307. 
14 See id. at 1306 (discussing that the police searched the attic of Welch’s apartment and 
discovered a weapon which Welch subsequently stated was his gun). 
15 See id. at 1307 (examining Welch’s prior criminal history in designating him eligible for 
the minimum fifteen-year sentence imposed by the Armed Career Criminal Act). 
16 See Welch, 683 F.3d at 1310–14 (outlining Welch’s argument that he should not have 
been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act because his prior theft conviction was 
not a crime of violence). 
17 See id. at 1313–14 (upholding Welch’s sentence).  The Court never decided whether 
Welch’s robbery conviction met the definition of a violent felony under the elements clause 
of the Armed Career Criminal Act because the Court found that it met the requirements for 
the residual clause and stopped at that.  See id. at 1313. 
18 See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (stating that the broad issue in Welch was whether the new 
rule in Johnson should apply retroactively). 
19 U.S. CONST., amend V.  
20  See Welch, 136 S. Ct at 1262 (stating that “in the Johnson Court’s view . . . the residual 
clause [was] more unpredictable and arbitrary in its application than the Constitution 
allows”).  
21 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (proclaiming that the “indeterminacy of the wide-ranging 
inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites 
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Traditionally, when the court creates a new rule of criminal law by 
invalidating part of a statute, they must next decide whether that rule is 
going to have retroactive application to cases that have already been 
adjudicated under the old rule.22  Early on, the Court struggled with 
finding a consistent standard for deciding when a new rule should or 
should not apply retroactively, and Justice Harlan attempted to persuade 
the Court to accept his proposed standard without success.23  Finally, after 
years of grasping to find a working test for when retroactive application 
applies, the Court adopted Justice’s Harlan’s approach in Teague v. Lane.24  
Teague, which is the current test that the Court applies, hinges on whether 
the new rule created is substantive or procedural.25  The Teague analysis, 
generally, starts with the assumption that the interests of finality are so 
strong that retroactive application is not allowed.26  However, the 
Supreme Court has carved out two exceptions to this general rule, and 
allowed retroactive application on collateral appeal where: (1) the new 
rule is a substantive change; or (2) when the new rule is a watershed rule 
of fairness in criminal procedure.27 
                                                
arbitrary enforcement by judges” and by “increasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause 
denies due process of law.”). 
22  Compare Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 232, 245 (1990) (holding that imposition of the 
death penalty by sentencer that had false belief that the responsibility lied elsewhere was not 
afforded retroactive application) with Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) 
(providing that the new rule stating that juveniles could not be sentenced to life without 
parole would be afforded retroactive application).  
23 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (outlining 
a three-consideration test to decide whether a new rule applied retroactively).  In Williams v. 
United States, Justice Harlan wrote a separate opinion to dissent to the way the court was 
reviewing retroactive application.  Id.  See also Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 
(1971) (criticizing the way the Court was reviewing retroactive application).  In criticizing 
the Court’s evaluation of retroactive application, Justice Harlan stated that “the Court is free 
to act, in effect, like a legislature, making its new constitutional rules wholly or partially 
retroactive or only prospective as it deems wise” and that Justice Harlan “completely 
disagree[s] with this point of view.”  Id. at 677. 
24  See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (explaining that the Court has adopted Justice Harlan’s view 
of retroactivity for cases on collateral review). 
25  See In re Patrick, 833 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that substantive changes in the 
law created by a new rule are retroactive, while procedural changes to the law are not). 
26  See Desist, 394 U.S. at 254 (holding that new rule concerning electronic surveillance law 
was not applied retroactively to cases that had been decided before the rule change).  See also 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 (1990) (holding that new rule barring police-initiated 
interrogation after request for counsel was not given retroactive application to collateral 
appeals); Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013) (holding that retroactive 
application was not appropriate where court held that counsel was required to explain 
deportation risks to their clients arising out of a guilty plea).  
27  See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (stating that when a decision has become final, the only way 
that retroactive application to collateral appeal will be allowed is where the new rule created 
is substantive or it is a watershed rule of criminal procedure).   
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In Teague, the Court explained that a new rule is substantive when it 
“alters the range of conduct or class of person that the law punishes.”28  
Furthermore, the Court has stated that a watershed rule of criminal 
procedure is a new rule that is fundamental in ensuring a fair criminal 
proceeding.29 Courts have rarely used the watershed exception in 
applying retroactivity to a new rule, and they have mostly concentrated 
on whether the new rule is either substantive or procedural.30  If the rule 
is found to be substantive it has retroactive applicability, while new 
procedural rules are not given retroactive effect.31  
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN WELCH V. UNITED STATES 
A. The Welch v. United States Decision 
In a seven-to-one decision, the Supreme Court held in Welch that the 
new rule created by the Court in Johnson, invalidating the residual clause 
of the Armed Career Criminal Act, applied retroactively to cases brought 
on collateral appeal.32  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by 
briefly discussing the Johnson decision and stating that the Court was 
reviewing the denial of a Certificate of Appealability for Welch to file his 
successive § 2255 habeus petition.33  Justice Kennedy, with very little 
discussion as to why the Certificate of Appealability should be issued, 
                                                
28   See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354 (explaining that a “decision that modifies 
the elements of an offense is normally substantive rather than procedural.”). 
29 See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (stating that the second exception created 
under Teague is the “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental 
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”).  
30 See Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 243 (discussing the limited use of the watershed rule exception).  
In Sawyer, Justice Kennedy quoted Teague and explained that finding that a new rule is a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure is very unlikely because it is unlikely that such 
fundamental bedrocks of due process have emerged yet.  Id.  See also Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 
406, 417 (2004) (stating that a watershed rule of criminal procedure “is clearly meant to apply 
only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit to 
the concept of ordered liberty.” (citations omitted)). 
31 See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620 (stating that procedural rules have no retroactive application 
because “unless a new rule of criminal procedure is of such a nature that without [it] the 
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished, there is no reason to apply the 
rule retroactively on habeus review.”). 
32 See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268 (finding that Johnson establish a new substantive rule that 
has retroactive effect).  The majority in Welch consisted of Justice Kennedy, who delivered 
the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Only eight Justices 
participated in the decision due to the passing of the late Justice Scalia.  Id. at 1260. 
33 See id. at 1263–64 (stating that the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals decided to deny Welch’s 
motion to bring a successive § 2255 petition because he failed to show an entitlement for 
relief and that a reasonable jurist would find that undebatable). 
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then turned to the retroactive application of the new rule created in 
Johnson.34  The Court began this discussion by looking at the language of 
the Armed Career Criminal Act and the residual clause located under the 
definition of a violent felony.35  He explained that the Court in Johnson 
found the residual clause unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine of the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment.36 
After establishing why the Johnson Court found the residual clause 
unconstitutional, the Court next turned to the broader issue presented in 
Welch; should the rule established in Johnson apply retroactively to people 
who had already been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 
residual clause.37  The Court answered this question by analyzing the new 
rule under the Teague framework, which hinged on whether the new rule 
was a substantive or procedural change to the law.38  The government 
attempted to argue that the rule was procedural because it was 
invalidated under procedural due process principles.39  The Court 
rejected this argument, however, stating that the constitutional principle 
which invalidated the law is not part of the analysis under Teague and 
found that the new rule was a substantive change because it changed “the 
range of conduct and the class of persons” that could be punished under 
the law.40  Therefore, the Court held that because the new rule was a 
                                                
34 See id. at 1264 (asserting that some reasonable jurists would find the issue debatable, 
then turning to the issue of retroactive application). 
35 See id. at 1261 (reciting the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause under the 
definition of a violent felony and discussing the minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen 
years for violation of the Act by possessing a firearm after three or more serious drug offenses 
or violent felonies).  Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)’s definition of a “violent felony”, there 
are two sections.  Section (i) referred to as the elements clause, defines a violent felony as a 
crime which “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another.”  Section (ii) contains the residual clause which encompasses 
crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”  The Court in Johnson found the residual clause unconstitutional but the 
elements clause and the enumerated offenses in Section (ii) remained in force.  135 S. Ct. at 
2563. 
36 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (discussing why the residual clause violates the Fifth 
Amendment). 
37 See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (advising that the broader legal issue of Welch is whether 
Johnson should be applied retroactively). 
38 See id. (showing when retroactivity is appropriate). 
39 See id. at 1266 (stating that when the Court is deciding whether a new rule should be 
retroactively applied, the Court should look to the underlying constitutional principle that 
created the new rule and decide whether that constitutional principle is procedural or 
substantive instead of the new rule itself). 
40 See id. at 1265–66 (rejecting the idea of applying the underlying constitutional principle 
test advanced by the government, stating that it “would untether the Teague framework from 
its basic purpose.”). 
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substantive change to the law, the new rule created in Johnson could be 
retroactively applied on collateral appeal.41 
B. Appraisal of the Welch v. United States Decision 
The Court in Welch reached the correct decision when it decided that 
the new rule created in Johnson was a substantive rule and as such, should 
be applied retroactively.42  The new rule created in Johnson changed the 
class of persons the law effects because someone that would have been 
sentenced to the fifteen-year minimum imposed before would not be 
subjected to the same sentence after the Court invalidated the residual 
clause.43  The Court, however, failed to fully discuss whether Welch 
should have been issued a Certificate of Appealability to bring his case on 
a successive habeus petition, when the District Court found Welch’s 
sentence appropriate under the elements clause and the residual clause of 
the Armed Career Criminal Act.44  
To bring his case before the Court, Welch was required to obtain a 
Certificate of Appealability, which the Court should only grant when “a 
reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether defendant has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”45  Therefore, 
for the Court to issue Welch a Certificate of Appealability, Welch should 
have been required to show that he was sentenced under the residual 
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act by the District Court and not the 
elements clause.46  If Welch was sentenced under the elements clause, his 
                                                
41 See id. at 1268 (holding that the rule in Johnson should apply retroactively in Welch).  
42 See generally Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (involving a new sentencing rule which stated 
that juveniles could not be sentenced to life prison sentences without the possibility of parole 
and the Court, similar to Welch, found that the new rule was a substantive change to the law 
and could be applied retroactively because it changed the class of persons that the law 
punished).   
43 See Welch, 134 S. Ct. at 1265 (advising that an offender would be facing a sentence of 15 
years to life in prison if convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act, but that the same 
offender would now only be subjected to a ten-year maximum sentence when not subjected 
to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s mandatory minimum sentencing). 
44  See id. at 1262 (explaining that the District Court found that that Welch’s offense of 
strong-arm robbery qualified under both the elements clause and the residual clause of the 
Armed Career Criminal Act). 
45  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (stating that “[t]he petitioner must 
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the 
constitutional claims debatable or wrong”).  See also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) 
(stating that until a Certificate of Appealability is issued on petition for habeus relief, the 
federal courts lacks jurisdiction). 
46  See Montoya v. United States, 2016 WL 6810727, *1 (D. Utah 2016) (stating that to be 
able to file a habeus petition, defendant was required to show that at least one of his 
convictions no longer qualifies as a crime of violence).  See also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337–38 
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claim would not fall within the scope of the of the new rule created in 
Johnson because his conviction would fall outside the residual clause and 
the Court would not have issued the Certificate of Appealability for Welch 
to bring his case.47   
At the end of the Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy briefly concedes 
that there has not been a determination on whether Welch’s armed 
robbery conviction meets the elements clause of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act.48  He, however, justifies the Court’s position by stating that 
“reasonable jurists at least could debate” whether the conviction meets the 
elements clause.49  However, numerous jurisdictions have found that at 
least some level of their state’s robbery laws have met the elements 
clause’s requirements.50  If Welch’s armed robbery conviction does qualify 
under the element’s clause, and he was sentenced appropriately under 
that clause, he would have been unable to show that the District Court 
sentenced him under the residual clause to bring a claim that he was 
denied a constitutional right under Johnson.51  Therefore, the Court should 
have determined if Welch was sentenced under the elements clause of the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, because if so, he would not have a Johnson 
claim and they should not have issued a Certificate of Appealability to 
then decide the retroactive application issue.52   
                                                
(stating that the issuance of Certificates of Appealability should not be a “matter of course” 
and that it is the defendant’s burden to show more than “the absence of frivolity”). 
47 See Ziglar v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1322 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (stating that to 
bring a § 2255 claim for retroactive applicability of the new rule created in Johnson, a prisoner 
must “show that he was sentenced under the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal 
Act and that he falls within the scope of the new substantive rule announced in Johnson.”). 
48 See Welch, 134 S. Ct. at 1268 (explaining that on remand the Court of Appeals may well 
find that Welch’s arm robbery conviction qualifies under the elements clause and his fifteen-
year sentence will be upheld whether Johnson applies retroactively or not). 
49 Id. 
50 See Jondavid S. Delong, Annotation, What Constitutes “Violent Felony” for Purpose of 
Sentence Enhancement Under Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C.A § 924(e)(1)), 119 A.L.R. 
Fed. 319, § 20 Robbery (1994) (outlining that at least some level of the robbery statutes of 
Tennessee, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Colorado, Oregon, Kentucky, Texas, Virginia, South 
Carolina, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, and 
Massachusetts have been found by courts to qualify as a violent felony for purposes of 
sentencing an offender to the fifteen-year minimum sentence under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act). 
51  See Zigler, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (discussing that defendants are required to show that 
the court sentenced them under the residual clause and not the elements clause, to fall within 
the scope of Johnson, and to argue that he should be issued a Certificate of Appealability).  
52  See Welch, 134 S. Ct. at 1269 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (outlining the fault in issuing the 
Certificate of Appealability and stating that these “deficiencies should preclude us from 
deciding in this case whether Johnson is retroactive).  
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C. Anticipated Consequences of the Welch v. United States Decision 
Moving forward, the Court will have to decide whether the new rule 
created in Johnson applies retroactively to sentences levied under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines.53  The Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari in United States v. Beckles to decide whether the invalidation of 
the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act in Johnson will apply 
retroactively to the “almost identical” language of a violent felony in the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines.54  Circuits have differed in whether 
Johnson applies retroactively to the Sentencing Guidelines, and the 
decision may not be so straightforward because the Sentencing Guidelines 
are advisory.55  If the Court fails to apply Johnson retroactively to sentences 
levied under the almost same language in the Sentencing Guidelines, 
offenders will be unable to bring a collateral appeal of their sentences 
despite being sentenced under essentially the same language.56 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Welch, the Court correctly decided that the new rule in Johnson was 
substantive and should be retroactively applied.  However, the Court 
should not have come to this issue in Welch.  The Court should not have 
issued a Certificate of Appealability for Welch to bring his successive 
§2255 petition without thoroughly discussing whether a reasonable jurist 
would find it debatable that Welch was denied a constitutional right.  If 
they had thoroughly considered the issue, it is likely that Welch could 
have been denied the Certificate of Appealability because his prior 
conviction was a crime of violence under the elements clause of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act.  By allowing offenders to bring their claims when the 
underlying crime meets the requirements of the elements clause, the Court 
has subjected the circuit courts to needless re-sentencing decisions where 
                                                
53  See, e.g., In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2016) (deciding that the new rule in 
Johnson applies to the United States Sentencing Guidelines). 
54  See United States v. Walker, 214 F. Supp.3d 866, 873 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (stating that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Beckles, and discussing the issues that will likely 
be decided in the case).  
55  See In re Partick, 833 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that the Second, Fifth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have found that Johnson applies retroactively to the 
Sentencing Guidelines).  But see United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 846 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding a conviction under the crime of violence definition similar to the residual clause 
in the Sentencing Guidelines). 
56  See Beckles, 565 F.3d at 842 (upholding sentence under the crime of violence definition 
in § 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines despite its almost identical language to the residual 
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act). 
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the same fifteen-year sentence will be imposed under the elements clause 
of the same Act. 
Carl J. Hall* 
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